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BILINGUAL EDUCATION AND DESEGREGATION
Preventing the isolation of minority students in public schools
has been a central aim in civil rights litigation. In the landmark
decision Brown v. Board of Education,' the Supreme Court attacked
one facet of that isolation, racial segregation. The Court ruled that
deliberate separation of minority students violates the equal pro-
tection clause: 2 "[s]eparate educational facilities are inherently un-
equal." 8 In a series of decisions following Brown, the Supreme
Court delineated the scope of the state's duty and the types of
equitable remedies courts should employ to enforce the constitu-
tional mandate.
4
The issue of minority isolation arose also in the context of an
integrated classroom. In Lau v. Nichols,5 non-English speaking
Chinese students alleged that teaching classes only in English de-
prived them of a meaningful education. The Supreme Court
agreed, ruling that Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 8 re-
quired compensatory programs. Following Lau, bilingual-bicul-
tural programs were developed to ease the difficulties of linguistically
disadvantaged students.
7
Problems soon arose in attempting to design compensatory pro-
grams which would not violate the duty imposed by the desegrega-
tion decisions. Did Lau imply that a remedial program providing
separate but more than equal education to minorities was consti-
tutionally acceptable, or did it require that remedial education be
integrated? Is the choice to be left to the school board?
This Comment will examine the rights of school children and
the discretion afforded school districts in complying with the dual
'347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2 The fourteenth amendment provides in pertinent part:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV.
3 Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
4 See, e.g., Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406 (1977); Keyes v.
School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973); Swan v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of
Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
5414 U.S. 563 (1974).
6 "No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national
origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected
to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assist-
ance." Section 601, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976).
7 See, e.g., CoLo. REv. STAT. § 22-24 (Supp. 1978); note 75 infra.
(1564)
BILINGUAL EDUCATION
mandates of Brown and Lau. The first two sections argue that bi-
lingual education and integration are theoretically and empirically
compatible. Section III explores the state's duty to integrate schools,
as that duty is defined by the Constitution and pertinent statutes.
Constitutional and statutory mandates are also the focus of the next
two sections which examine the duties to provide bilingual educa-
tion and to integrate bilingual classrooms. Finally, section VI evalu-
ates the usefulness of bilingual programs as part of desegregation
remedies.
I. THE THEORETICAL COMPATIBILITY OF INTEGRATION AND
BILINGUAL-BIcULTURAL EDUCATION
Given the constitutionally based policy in favor of integrating
students of all races," demands for bilingual education are trouble-
some. If integration means the nonrecognition of differences among
students, bilingual programs necessarily conflict because they ex-
plicitly recognize that students are not the same. On the other
hand, if integration is viewed as an opportunity to share the cul-
tural richness and diversity each student brings to the classroom,
integrated bilingual-bicultural classrooms will facilitate that shar-
ing. The equal protection clause, developed by a society concerned
about the physical separation of blacks and whites,9 is silent on which
interpretation of integration is most appropriate, and the case law
provides no dearer clue.10 One's view on the theoretical com-
patibility of integration and bilingual education is dictated largely
by one's policy choices in defining the goals of integration."
A. The Conflict View
According to one theory, integration and bilingual education
are conflicting goals. Integration is intended to promote the fusion
8 See notes 56-64 infra & accompanying text
9 The fourteenth amendment, passed in the aftermath of the Civil War, was
meant originally to prevent discrimination against blacks. Slaughter-House Cases,
83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). See R. Fern6ndez & J. Guskin, Bilingual Education
and Desegregation: A New Dimension in Legal and Educational Decision-Making
7-8 (1977) (unpublished paper, University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee).
10 The case law, in fact, suggests that "integration is as consistent with cultural
pluralism as it is with assimilation." Comment, Cultural Pluralism, 13 HARv. C.R.-
C.L. L. REv. 133, 143 (1978). The Court in Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S.
483 (1954), "did not indicate that an integrated society would preclude the preser-
vation of a distinct cultural heritage for blacks." Cultural Pluralism, supra at 143.
1 For a discussion of the differences between assimilatlonist and pluralist goals,
see Foster, Bilingual Education: An Educational and Legal Survey, 5 J.L. & EDJC.
149 (1976). The author notes that "[aissimilation is a function which generally
seems to follow from the dominant culture's need to ameliorate social problems,"
whereas pluralism, "while attentive to social problems, stresses more the basic values
of a society committed to diversity." Id. 155.
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of groups, to allow students to view the similarities among their
classmates. By eliminating the differences among people, a distinctly
"American" culture will emerge. The adherents of this position,
cultural monists, see bilingual-bicultural education as anathema.12
Recognition of the separate languages and cultures of minority
groups hinders assimilation.
Some cultural monists might acquiesce in what Rolf Kjolseth
has labeled an assimilationist model of bilingual education, which
sees bilingual education as a step to acquisition of the Anglo culture.
Non-English speaking students will be taught English and then
transferred to the monolingual program as soon as proficiency is
achieved. 13 Even this limited use of bilingual education can be
accepted by monists only as a necessary, temporary evil.
This assimilationist focus was recently adopted by the Ninth
Circuit in Guadalupe Organization, Inc. v. Tempe Elementary
School District No. 3.14 Non-English-speaking Mexican-American
and Yaqui Indian students sued to compel implementation of a bi-
lingual education program in place of a program of remedial learn-
ing. In rejecting the plaintiffs' claim that bilingual education is
required by the equal protection clause, the court stated:
Linguistic and cultural diversity within the nation-
state, whatever may be its advantages from time to time,
can restrict the scope of the fundamental compact. Diver-
sity limits unity. Effective action by the nation-state rises
to its peak of strength only when it is in response to
aspirations unreservedly shared by each constituent cul-
12 The cultural monist approach to integration is not, however, inherently in-
compatible with bilingual-bicultural education. If society is viewed as a melting
pot comprising a blend of various cultures rather than an embodiment of the ma-
jority's values, the cultural monist sees bilingual education as a means of furthering
the unity of the evolving structure. The ideal, according to this view of the melting
pot, would be integration of every school according to the respective percentages of
the various subcultures in the general population. Cf. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416
U.S. 312, 334 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("The melting pot is not designed
to homogenize people, making them uniform in consistency. The melting pot as I
understand it is a figure of speech that depicts the wide diversities tolerated by the
First Amendment under one flag."). See also Cultural Pluralism, supra note 10, at
135.
13 Kjolseth, Bilingual Education Programs in the United States: For Assimilation
or Pluralism? in BiraNGu.Amsm iN THE SOUTHWEST 3, 11 (1973). An assimilationist
model of bilingual education encourages rapid and near complete transfer to a
nonethnic standard, gives school administrators total program control, employs teach-
ers as role models of Anglo culture, and ignores local dialects. Id. 12-14. Kjolseth
estimates that at least eighty percent of bilingual programs approximate this model
Id. 15-16.
14 587 F.2d 1022 (9th Cir. 1978). The court held that, "[aissuming adequate
remedial instruction, education in English, reflecting American culture and values
only, is not a discriminatory course of conduct." Id. 1029.
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ture and language group. As affection which a culture or
group bears toward a particular aspiration abates, and as
the scope of sharing diminishes, the strength of the nation-
state's government wanes. 15
Additionally, the court bolstered its assimilationist stance by reading
narrowly the Civil Rights Act of 1964 16 and the Equal Education
Opportunity Act of 19741.7 as not requiring implementation of
bilingual-bicultural programs.
18
B. The Compatibility View
An alternative position, the pluralist approach, sees bilingual
education and desegregation as mutually supportive.19 Integration
is meant to instill mutual appreciation among groups and to crumble
stereotypes by fostering understanding of the cultural differences
among people. Contact with different types of persons results in
enriched lives and broadened outlooks. The very differences may
even be a source of cohesion as each group is both "teacher" and
"student." At the very least, mutual appreciation will promote
acceptance and respect.
20
A pluralist model of bilingual education 21 reinforces the goals
of integration. Bilingual education is aimed at increasing the self-
respect of minority students by teaching their own culture and lan-
15 Id. 1027.
Taking an opposing point of view, the New Mexico State Deparbnent of Edu-
cation has found that an assimilationist program "tends to deny the realities of the
world which the child will experience outside the academic environment, as well as
place strictures on his ability to learn within the school." Statement of Bilingual
Teacher Training Unit, New Mexico State Department of Education 3 (Eric No.
ED 129-084, 1976).
16Title VI, § 601, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976). For further discussion of this
issue, see notes 76-110 infra & accompanying text.
17 Section 204, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1703, 1703(f) (1978). For further discussion of
this issue, see notes 111-21 infra & accompanying text.
18 Guadalupe Org., Inc. v. Tempe Elem. School Dist. No. 3, 587 F.2d 1022,
1029-30 (9th Cir. 1978).
19 Cultural pluralism does not necessarily imply compatibility of bilingual edu-
cation and integration. If the melting pot is seen as a blend of various subcultures,
see note 12 supra, the pluralist may encourage segregation because integration
would lead to a monist society.
2 0 See Cultural Pluralism, supra note 10, at 136, and the authorities cited
therein.
21 Kjolseth defined a pluralist model of bilingual education as one which encour-
ages use of both languages in and out of the school, reinforces and develops the
native culture, uses native dialects, employs teachers as bicultural role models, and
seeks to obtain parental support through adult bilingual education programs.
Kjolseth, supra note 13, at 1-11.
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guage.2 2  Students proud of their cultural heritage provide a more
confident and knowledgeable resource for other students. Anglos
in a bilingual-bicultural classroom have the advantage of exposure
to a culture they might not otherwise experience. Although non-
Anglos may have other means outside the school for acquiring an
appreciation of Anglo culture, an integrated classroom conceivably
provides one of the few opportunities for associating with Anglos as
peers in an environment fostering respect for both cultures. Rec-
ognition of all cultures benefits all students, and mutual apprecia-
tion increases.
23
Some support for the values embodied in the pluralist model
of integration are found in Justice Powell's opinion in Regents o1
the University of California v. Bakke.24 In Bakke, a white medical-
school applicant successfully challenged the school's practice of re-
serving a certain number of spaces for minority applicants. Justice
Powell found compelling the state interest in fostering diversity in
the composition of the student body:
Physicians serve a heterogeneous population. An other-
wise qualified medical student with a particular background
--whether it be ethnic, geographic, culturally advantaged or
disadvantaged-may bring to a professional school of medi-
cine experiences, outlooks and ideas that enrich the train-
ing of its student body and better equip its graduates to
render with understanding their vital service to humanity.
2 5
22 Bilingual education is the use of two languages one of which is English,
as mediums of instruction for the same pupil population in a well organized
program which encompasses part or all of the curriculum and includes the
study of the history and culture associated with the mother tongue. A
complete program develops and maintains the children's self-esteem and a
legitimate pride in both cultures.
U.S. OFFicE oF EDuc., PRoGRAms UNDER BminGuA EDUCATION ACT (TrnLE VII,
ESEA), MANuAL FOR lhojEcr AxPxucArs AND GRANTEEs 1 (1970).
23 [A]ctual integration of students and faculty at a school, by setting the
stage for meaningful and continuous exchanges between the races, educates
white and Negro students equally in the fundamentals of racial tolerance
and understanding.... [Llearning to live interracially is, or in a democracy
should be, a vital component in every student's educational experience.
Elementary school integration enables the very young of either race to
accept each other as persons before racial attitudes and prejudices have a
chance to intrude and harden; Negro and white children playing innocently
together in the schoolyard are the primary liberating promise in a society
imprisoned by racial consciousness.
Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 419 (D.D.C. 1967), aff'd and remanded sub
nom. Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (citations omitted). This
concept of mutual appreciation would seemingly include also the cultural and
linguistic traits of minority groups.
24438 U.S. 265 (1978).
251 d. 314 (footnote omitted) (Powell, J.).
BILINGUAL EDUCATION
Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun also found the
school's admission program "sufficiently important to justify use of
race-conscious admissions criteria." 26 Just as diversity can enrich
a medical school program, so it can enrich an elementary school
program. Integration and pluralism in an elementary school may
thus further the same values recognized by five Justices in Bakke.
Although Justice Powell and the Ninth Circuit 27 differed re-
garding the values of assimilation and pluralism, neither suggested
that the Constitution favors one of these approaches. 2 Bilingual
education may therefore be regarded as theoretically compatible with
the goals of integration.
II. TiB EMPIRICAL COMPATIBILITY OF INTEGRATION AND
BILINGUAL EDUCATION
Regardless whether homogeneity or diversity is socially desirable,
an educational program's effectiveness in teaching students basic
linguistic skills and substantive knowledge is of crucial importance.
If bilingual techniques are not beneficial for English speaking stu-
dents, integrating bilingual education classes may be pedagogically
unsound. If, on the other hand, both English and non-English
speaking students learn as well in bilingual as in monolingual class-
rooms, integration will not sacrifice educational quality. Central to
the subsequent legal analysis exploring whether integrated bilingual
classes are constitutionally required is an assessment of the educa-
tional effects of bilingual education.2 9
The major nationwide study assessing the impact of bilingual
education programs in the United States was performed by the
26Id. 362 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part).
27 See notes 14-18 supra & accompanying text.
28The Ninth Circuit adopted a neutral stance: "[T]he Constitution neither re-
quires nor prohibits the bilingual and bicultural education sought by the appellants.
Such matters are for the people to decide." Guadalupe Org., Inc. v. Tempe Elem.
School Dist. No. 3, 587 F.2d 1022, 1027 (9th Cir. 1978). Similarly, Justice Powell
did not assert in Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke that the Constitution requires
states to aim for diversity in the student body. 438 U.S. 265, 314 (1978) (Powell,
I.). The absence of a constitutional policy with regard to assimilation and plural-
ism stands in contrast to the well established Constitutional presumption support-
ing integration, see notes 56-64 infra & accompanying text.
29If an Anglo child's education in a bilingual classroom is inferior to that he
would receive in a monolingual classroom, such a harm might tip the constitutional
balance against requiring integration of bilingual classrooms. Specifically, avoiding
such a harm might qualify as a compelling state interest and justify racially sepa-
rate bilingual classrooms. See note 203 infra & accompanying text.
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American Institute for Research in the Behavioral Sciences (AIR). 30
Conducted from 1975 to 1977, the AIR study evaluated the achieve-
ment of over 11,500 students in 384 classrooms. The research
spanned 150 schools and thirty-eight different sites.31 Tests meas-
ured student performance in English oral comprehension and read-
ing, Spanish oral comprehension and reading, and mathematics.
32
Students in bilingual projects funded by the federal government
under the Bilingual Education Act, Title VII of the Elementary
and Secondary Education Act,33 were tested both at the beginning
and end of the 1975-76 school year.34 The results were compared
with the results of similar tests administered to students not in Title
VII bilingual programs. A third test was given to a subsample of
second and third grade students the following fall to evaluate their
retention of subject matter over the summer. 5
In addition to comparing Title VII and non-Title VII students,
the study was designed to uncover those characteristics of students
or teachers most associated with high achievement in bilingual class-
rooms. In analyzing the test results, researchers classified students
according to ethnicity, socioeconomic status, age, and sex.36 Teach-
ers and aids were categorized according to their qualifications, meas-
ured by training, experience, and bilinguality.37 Study directors
then compiled survey results for each of the categories to determine
the degree of correlation with student achievement.
38
30 AMERICAN INSTIrUTE FOR RESEARCH I TIE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES, EVALUA-
TION OF THE IMPACT OF ESEA TITLE VII SPANISH/ENGLISH BMINGUAL EDUCATION
PROGRAM [hereinafter cited as AIR Study]. The study's results are published in
three volumes: Volume I (ERIC No. ED 138-090, 1977); Volume H (ERIC No.
ED 138-091, 1977); Volume III (ERIC No. ED 154-635, 1978). A fourth volume
(ERIC No. ED 154-634, 1978) provides an overview of the study and findings
[hereinafter cited as Overview].
31 Id. Overview, supra note 30, at 3.
32 Id. 6. Student attitudes were also tested.
33 Sections 701-751, 20 U.S.C. §§ 3221-3261 (Supp. 1979). All projects exam-
ined were at least in their fifth year of funding under Title VIL
34 Overview, supra note 30, at 2.
5Id.
36 Id. 3.
37 Id.
38 Some commentators feel that the study's methodological defects give the re-
sults little credence. See, e.g., INTRCULTURAL DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH AssN,
T E AIR EVALUATION OF THE IMPACT OF ESEA Trrr VII SPANIsH/ENGLISH BI-
LINGUAL EDUCATION PROGRAMS (ERIC No. ED 151-435, 1977) (with summary by
Dr. Jose Cardenas) [hereinafter cited as IDRA REsPONSE]; T. GRAY, RESPONSE TO
AIR STUDY "EVALUATION OF THE IMPACT OF ESEA Tr.= VII SPANIsH/ENGLISH
BILINGUAL EDUCATION PROGRAM" (ERIC No. ED 138-122, 1977). Although these
objections seem somewhat overstated, the study may be validly criticized in three
areas: inadequacy and lack of uniformity of the bilingual programs sampled; in-
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A. Class Composition
Descriptions of the composition of Title VII 39 classes were the
most striking findings of the AIR study:
Generally, less than a third of the students in the Title
VII classrooms were there because of their need for English
instruction (limited proficiency in English) as judged by
the classroom teacher. For students of Hispanic back-
ground, 35% in the second-grade Title VII classrooms
were there because of their need for English instruction.
For grades 3, 4, 5, and 6, the corresponding percentages
were, respectively, 30%, 29%, 19%, and 27%.4o
Title VII programs are not, therefore, primarily a vehicle to teach
non-English speaking students substantive subject matter while they
adequacy and lack of uniformity of the comparison groups; and improper use of
testing and statistical methods.
The bilingual programs sampled varied widely in teacher qualifications and
teaching techniques. IDRA RESPONSE, supra at 10. Although AIR purportedly
examined the effect of teacher qualifications on student performance, AIR STony,
supra note 30, at VII-1 to 2, the crudeness of the qualifications assessment under-
cuts the validity of the finding. IDRA RESPONSE, supra at iii, 13-14. Almost half
the bilingual teachers may not have attained fluency in Spanish, id. iv, 17, and
may therefore have conducted some of the bilingual programs entirely in English.
The wide variety of program goals and teaching techniques also makes the Title
VII category subject to considerable intragroup variation, perhaps affecting the
validity of the statistical techniques.
The AIR Study also did not accurately establish comparison groups. An esti-
mated one-third of the teachers and aids labeled non-Title VII were involved in
a bilingual program. Id. iii. If these teachers utilized their foreign language skills
or bilingual-bicultural teaching techniques on students in the control group, com-
paring Title VII and non-Title VII programs may not reveal much about bilingual
education. Moreover, the validity of the comparison is diminished by the occa-
sional failure to choose non-Title VII students with the same curriculum or in the
same school district as the Title VII group. Id. ii-iii, 4. IDRA alleges that this
shortcoming has a substantial impact on the AIR results, in fact that 50% of the
Title VII group did not have a non-Title VII comparison. Id. 5-6.
Testing and statistical techniques may have further distorted the results. In
approximately fifty percent of the classrooms, pretests and posttests were conducted
within a five-month span, allowing little time for classroom techniques to become
effective. Id. iii, 9. But see 3 AIR STUoy, supra note 30, at 11-47 (differences in
time spans were examined to determine possible effect on results). The English
language achievement tests had not been proven reliable for limited English speak-
ing students. GRAY, supra at 2. Finally, teacher assessment of student language
ability may be inaccurate. IDRA RESPONSE, supra at ii, 2.
Because of these defects in the AIR methodology, the results are not mathe-
matically precise, but only rough measures of the success of bilingual programs. The
study results nevertheless provide some valuable insights, especially where sim-
ple, class composition data, not subject to most of these methodological flaws, were
compiled, rather than statistical analyses performed.
39 Sections 701-751, 20 U.S.C. §§ 3221-3261 (Supp. 1979).
4 0 Overview, supra note 30, at 10.
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acquire English. On the contrary, the programs in operation teach
far more students who speak English than who require remedial
instruction. These findings are certainly surprising, especially in
light of the avowed Title VII purpose to teach students of limited
English speaking ability 41 and the explicit denial of an intent to
teach a language other than English.42
The class composition data take on added significance when the
English speaking group is scrutinized. AIR researchers discovered
that seventy-five percent of the students in bilingual classrooms were
Hispanic; 43 in fact, English speaking Hispanics constituted a plu-
rality in the Title VII classrooms. Because participation in these
programs is optional for English speaking students,4  these data
obviously indicate that some Hispanic students fluent in English
prefer bilingual classes. Similarly, few of the Hispanic students
with limited English speaking ability chose to leave when able to
function in English.45  Apparently, bilingual education serves to
satisfy various linguistic and cultural needs of minorities. Rather
than isolating only those students in need of remedial instruction,
optional bilingual programs are separating also those minorities
able to speak English.
46
B. Achievement
The AIR data confirm neither the hypothesis that students of
limited English speaking ability are substantially benefited by bi-
lingual programs nor the theory that Anglo students are substantially
harmed. For Hispanic students with limited English speaking
ability, AIR discovered that achievement relative to national norms
in English and vocabulary remained constant between pretest and
posttest.4 7 Because almost all students of limited English speaking
ability were in the Title VII 48 programs, whether they were better
off in bilingual classes than they would have been without these
41 Section 703, 20 U.S.C. §3223(a)(4)(A) (Supp. 1979).
42 Id. See Overview, supra note 30, at 10-11.
4 3 Oveiview, supra note 30, at 8.
4 4 Section 703, 20 U.S.C. § 3223(a) (4) (B) (Supp. 1979).
45 Overview, supra note 30, at 10. This does not necessarily mean that the
programs follow the "maintenance model," that they seek to maintain the Spanish
language and encourage its use outside of the classroom. See Kjolseth, supra note
13, at 9.
4 6 For a discussion of the causes of these data, see notes 191-94 infra & ac-
companying text.
47 1 AIR STUDY, supra note 30, at VI-76.
48 Sections 701-751, 20 U.S.C. §§ 3221-3261 (Supp. 1979).
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programs is unclear.49 Certainly, the gap between themselves and
their Anglo peers is not dosing rapidly.
The English language gain of English speaking Title VII stu-
dents was not as great as the gain of comparable non-Title VII
students. In fact, the achievement of Anglo students declined ap-
preciably relative to national norms 0 Anglo Title VII students
were learning, but not as fast as their non-Title VII counterparts.
The mathematics and Spanish test results differed. In mathe-
matics, all groups in bilingual classes showed gains relative to the
national norms.51 Moreover, Spanish reading test scores for all
Title VII students increased.52 Indeed, the opportunity for Spanish
language acquisition and development was an advantage unique to
the Tide VII classrooms, and the slower English language growth
rate for English speaking Title VII students is conceivably at-
tributable to the attention given to Spanish in addition to English
in those classrooms.5
3
The achievement test results do not demonstrate a substantial
overall harm to Anglos participating in bilingual programs. Never-
theless, some tradeoffs are involved. English speaking students in
bilingual programs acquire mathematics skills at the same rate as
their non-Title VII counterparts, but are learning English language
arts at a slower rate. In exchange, they are acquiring a second
language and exposure to a second culture.
The AIR study results are inconclusive, and more research is
necessary.5 4 The final determination of the educational soundness
49 If bilingual programs are not helping limited English speaking students, they
are failing to remedy the lack of meaningful education found in Lau v. Nichols,
414 U.S. 563 (1974). Bilingual education is based on the premise, generally ac-
cepted among educators, that students learn better in their native language than in
a foreign language. See Gaardner, Statement to the Special Subcommittee on Bi-
lingual Educ. of the Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, U.S. SENATE, 90th Cong.,
51-55 (1967) reprinted in THE LANGUAGE EDUCATION OF MINOurTY CRrnEN 51-52
(1972). In one review of the existing empirical research, bilingual education was
found generally to have had positive effects for linguistic minorities. L. ZAPPERT &
B. CRuz, BIINGUAL EDUCATION: AN APPRAISAL OF EzVss'mIcAL RESEARCH (ERIC No.
ED 153-758, 1977).
50 1 AIR STmUY, supra note 30, at VI-77.
51 Id. 90.
52 Id. VIII-5. The progress of Title VII students in Spanish reading could not
be compared with that of non-Title VII students because the latter were not taught
Spanish.
5 3 The study also found "no clear trend" indicating that Title VII participation
had a positive impact on students' attitudes toward school. Id. VIII-5.
54 The study does not measure the 6ffects of forced bilingual integration. The
few Anglos in the program attended voluntarily. An Anglo child forced into a bi-
lingual class may not be as receptive to the bilingual curriculum, and the results
may thus be less positive. See note 203 infra.
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of integrated bilingual programs may depend on a policy choice
between the tradeoffs and competing values.
III. THE DEVELOPING LEGAL DOCTRINE:
THE DUTY TO INTEGRATE
Defining the right of minority school children to obtain a mean-
ingful education in an integrated environment and the concom-
mitant duty of school districts to uphold this right has been an
emotional and often complex process. The statutory and constitu-
tional fabric of desegregation has become much more extensive and
sophisticated since the duty to provide integrated schools was first
established in 1954 in Brown v. Board of Education 5  The Su-
preme Court has not yet satisfactorily delineated the twin com-
ponents of this right as they operate separately, much less in tandem.
Before evaluating the constitutionality of segregated bilingual class-
rooms, one must first define unlawful educational segregation of
ethnic minorities and the school district's duty to provide education
in a language the student can understand.
A. The Constitutional Mandate
In Brown v. Board of Education, the Supreme Court held that
the equal protection clause prohibits states from deliberately segre-
gating students by race.5 6 In subsequent decisions the Court has
categorized racial classifications as "suspect" and has ruled that any
statute or practice separating individuals on that basis can be up-
held only if able to withstand analysis under the strictest level of
judicial scrutiny.57 A state may thus intentionally separate stu-
dents by race only after showing "that its purpose or interest is both
constitutionally permissible and substantial, and that its use of the
classification is 'necessary... to the accomplishment' of its purpose
or the safeguarding of its interest." 58 In applying this compelling
state interest test, the Court has rarely found segregative state action
directed at racial or ethnic minorities constitutionally permissible.5 9
55 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
56 Id. 495.
57See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida,
379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964).
58 See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 305 (1978)
(Powell, J.) (citing In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 722-23 (1973)). See San Antonio
Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1973).
59 The difficulty of meeting the compelling state interest test suggests a pre-
sumption in favor of integration. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944),
and Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943), however, permitted
classifications on the basis of national origin to promote national security during
wartime.
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Neutral classifications that have disproportionate racial im-
pacts, as distinguished from the state law invalidated in Brown, do
not manifestly evince a purpose on the part of the state to separate
individuals on the basis of race. Students challenging the constitu-
tionality of segregation resulting from facially neutral classifications
must first demonstrate the state's segregative intent before strict
judicial scrutiny is triggered: de facto segregation is not alone suf-
ficient.60
If intentional racial segregation is found, the school district
must show both a state interest sufficiently compelling to justify that
segregation and the unavailability of a less restrictive alternative.
A school district unable to meet these burdens, held the Court in
Brown,61 will be ordered to eliminate all vestiges of the equal pro-
tection violation "with all deliberate speed." Brown left unan-
swered, however, many questions regarding the appropriate rem-
edies. For example, the Court failed to articulate exactly what
constitutes a "vestige" and the extent to which a district court is
empowered to redistribute students to achieve maximum integra-
tion. These questions were resolved partially in Dayton Board of
Education v. Brinkman, 2 mandating a "but for test" in determining
the appropriate scope of a remedial order.63  A district court may
only place the school system in the position in which it would have
been had the violation not occurred.
The Dayton "but for" approach raises two problems. First,
the position the school district would have been in might not be the
most conducive to learning. Surely a court of equity should be jus-
tified in ordering transition to a system more educationally beneficial
to all students. Only if additional upheaval would result from the
transition should a court be restricted.s Second, ascertaining how
0o Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 419-20 (1977); Washington
v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976). The problem with the intent requirement is
that the existence of the detrimental impact of segregation on school children, Brown
v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493-95 (1954), does not depend upon whether
the segregation is de facto or de jure.
61 Brown v. Board of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
62433 U.S. 406 (1977).
63 Id. 420.
64 Courts of equity should balance the costs and benefits of the readjustment
caused by each of the plans proposed. The Court's decision in Dayton Bd. of Educ.
v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406 (1977), protected the whites from paying a greater price
for desegregation than the unconstitutional actions of the school board warranted.
This approach seems fictional, however, because the white school children were not
the perpetrators of the prior violation. Perhaps one reason to permit a court to
order complete integration, accompanied by judicial supervision, is the unavoidable
suspiciousness of a majority-controlled school board guilty of a prior violation. See
notes 191-94 infra & accompanying text.
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the school district would be operating absent the constitutional
violation may be difficult and the court's remedy therefore largely
conjectural.
B. The Statutory Requirements
Although the Supreme Court has issued numerous rulings on
public school desegregation under the equal protection clause, it
has attempted only infrequently to define the scope of the statutory
requirements. Title VI provides: "No person in the United States
shall, on the ground of race, color or national origin, be excluded
from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance." 65
An implementing regulation, Regulation A, was promulgated
in 1964 by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
(HEW). Regulation A prohibits recipients of federal assistance,
in selecting types of services and facilities, from using "criteria or
administrative methods which have the effect of subjecting indi-
viduals to discrimination because of their race, color, or national
origin." Il By forbidding actions with discriminatory effects re-
gardless of the motivation behind them, HEW has seemingly ex-
tended the protections of Title VI beyond those afforded by the
Constitution. Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,7
however, casts doubt on the validity of this regulation. Five Jus-
tices agreed there that Title VI goes no further than the Constitution
in defining the components of discrimination. 8
Intentional segregation is also prohibited by the Equal Educa-
tional Opportunities Act of 1974: 69 "No State shall deny equal
educational opportunity to an individual on account of his or her
race, color, sex, or national origin, by-(a) the deliberate segrega-
tion by an educational agency of students on the basis of race, color,
65 Section 601, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976).
6645 C.F.R. § 80.3(b)(2) (1978).
67438 U.S. 265 (1978).
68 Id. 284-87 (Powell, J.), 328 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment in part
and dissenting in part). Because of HEW's expertise in the field of education, any
conflict regarding the scope of Title VI, § 601, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976), should
arguably be resolved in their favor. Cf. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 47 U.S.L.W.
4851, 4854-55 & n.6 (U.S. June 27, 1979) (Nos. 78-432, 78-435, & 78-436) (uphold-
ing voluntary race-conscious affirmative action under Title VII, § 701, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e (1976), and distinguishing Title VI because the former was intended to
regulate private decisionmaking and not to incorporate the fifth and fourteenth
amendments).
69 Sections 202-223, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1721 (1978).
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or national origin among or within schools .... ,, 70 The word
"deliberate" indicates that the statute apparently comports with
Supreme Court decisions interpreting the fourteenth amendment
to include an element of intent.71 The statutory prohibitions thus
appear to be coextensive with those of the Constitution.
IV. THE DUTY TO PROVIDE BILINGUAL EDUCATION
The requirement that school districts teach students in a lan-
guage they can understand, though of recent vintage, is becoming
forcefully entrenched. The right of non-English speaking students
to remedial programs, the sources of which are Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964,72 the Equal Educational Opportunities Act of
1974,73 and the equal protection clause, was confirmed in 1974 by
the Supreme Court in Lau v. Nichols.74 Despite the recent com-
mitment of both the Court and the Congress to remedial language
programs,75 the scope and foundation of the right to compensatory
education remains elusive.
A. The Statutory Requirements
1. Title VI
Although the Supreme Court has not often used Title VI 76
in the school desegregation area, it has ruled that the statute in-
validates school programs having the effect of affording unequal
educational opportunity to non-English speaking students. In Lau
v. Nichol,77 the Supreme Court affirmed the right of 1800 non-
70 Id. §§ 1703-1703(a) (1978) (emphasis supplied). But see id. § 1703(c),
prohibiting
the assignment by an educational agency of a student to a school, other
than the one closest to his or her place of residence within the school district
in which he or she resides, if the assignment results in a greater degree of
segregation of students on the basis of race, color, sex, or national origin
among the schools of such agency than would result if such student were
assigned to the school closest to his or her place of residence.
(emphasis supplied).
71 Although most courts have decided school segregation cases on constitutional
grounds, at least one has employed id. § 1703(a) to invalidate intentional segrega-
tion. Cintron v. Brentwood Union Free School Dist., 455 F. Supp. 57, 63 & n.11
(E.D.N.Y. 1978). This analysis suggests that many cases decided under the equal
protection clause should first have been analyzed under Title VI, § 601, 42 U.S.C.
§2000d (1976).
72 Section 601, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976).
73 Section 204, 20 U.S.C. § 1703(f) (1978).
74414 U.S. 563 (1974).
75 See, e.g., Bilingnal Education Act, §§ 701-751, 20 U.S.C. §§ 3221-3261
(Supp. 1979) (granting federal funds for bilingual and other special projects).
76 Section 601, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976).
77414 U.S. 563 (1974).
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English-speaking Chinese students in the San Francisco School Dis-
trict to a remedial program specially tailored to their needs. The
Court found that offering the same services to all students was simply
inadequate:
Under these state-imposed standards there is no equal-
ity of treatment merely by providing students with the same
facilities, textbooks, teachers, and curriculum; for students
who do not understand English are effectively foreclosed
from any meaningful education.
Basic English skills are at the very core of what these
public schools teach. Imposition of a requirement
that, before a child can effectively participate in the edu-
cational program, he must already have acquired those
basic skills is to make a mockery of public education. We
know that those who do not understand English are certain
to find their classroom experiences wholly incomprehen-
sible and in no way meaningful.78
The Court's willingness to extend Title VI to authorize a spe-
cial program is attributable to the clear mandate of HEW's Regula-
tion A 79 and a 1970 HEW memorandum.8 0 The memorandum
states that programs having the effect of excluding students because
of linguistic differences are violative of Title VI and must be rem-
edied by affirmative programs.8' The Lau Court upheld Regulation
A as a rational clarification of the statute without addressing whether
the language or legislative history of Title VI mandates-or even
permits-HEW's "effect test" or its affirmative remedies.8 2  The
Court's reliance on the regulation alone is especially problematic
in view of its possible subsequent repudiation in Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke.
8s
78 Id. 566.
79 45 C.F.R. § 80.3(b)(2) (1978).
80 May 25, 1970 Memorandum from the Director, Office for Civil Rights, HEW,
to School Districts with More than Five Percent National Origin-Minority Group
Children, 35 Fed. Reg. 11, 595 (1970) [hereinafter cited as 1970 Memorandum].
81Id.
82 Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 568 (1974).
83438 U.S. 265 (1978). Justice Brennan suggests that Regents of the Univ.
of Cal. v. Bakke, id., is inconsistent with Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974), that
the latter case seemed to imply that Title VI, § 601, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976),
prohibitions were more stringent than those of the Constitution. 438 U.S. at 352
(Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment in part & dissenting in part). HEW's
interpretation should, however, have at least some advisory force. See note 68 supra
& accompanying text.
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The brief Lau opinion left open many fundamental questions
regarding both the scope and the legal basis of a school district's
duty. Three principal areas are particularly troublesome. First, by
focusing upon the denial of "any meaningful education" to non-
English speaking students, the Court avoided deciding what degree
of deprivation triggers a Title VI violation. Second, Lau raised the
possibility that Title VI applies only when large numbers of stu-
dents are deprived and perhaps not in the case of a single non.
English speaking student. Third, the Court did not explore the
types of programs able to provide an effective remedy.
a. Denial of "any meaningful education"
By emphasizing the complete inability of non-English speaking
Chinese students to compete in the educational system in Lau v.
Nichols,84 the Court did not decide whether a total deprivation of
education was required to make out a Title VI 85 violation. Mi-
nority students have widely varying degrees of language skills, and
designing a curriculum sensitive to each gradation might require
numerous types of remedial programs. In 1975, HEW attempted to
clarify Regulation A s6 and Lau by defining those students entitled to
remedial education as those either monolingual in a language other
than English or dominant in such a language.8 7 Because the second
category of students does not experience a total deprivation with
English language instruction, HEW has seemingly extended Lau
to require a substantial degree of English language comprehension
before monolingual language instruction will suffice.
b. Application of Title VI to Small Numbers of Students
Perhaps the most vexing problems posed by Lau v. Nichols 88
stem from the concurrence of Justice Blackmun, joined by Chief
Justice Burger. For Justice Blackmun, "numbers [were] at the
heart of this case." 89 Although this notion was left undeveloped
in his opinion, Justice Blackmun's central concern appears to have
84414 U.S. 563 (1974).
8 Section 601, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976).
8645 C.F.R. § 80.3(b) (2) (1978).
87 HEW Task Force Findings Specifying Remedies Available for Eliminating
Past Educational Practices Ruled Unlawful Under Lau v. Nichols 9-12 (Aug. 11,
1975), reprinted in CENTEm FoR LAw AND EDUCATION, BILt ct,-BxcuvLruA EDu-
CATION (1975) [hereinafter cited as HEW Task Force Findings].
88414 U.S. 563 (1974).
89 Id. 572 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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been the difficulty and cost of providing compensatory education
when only a few students are linguistically disadvantaged. Argu-
ably, a school district has no obligation to devote a disproportion-
ately high percentage of its resources to a small number of chil-
dren.90 A resulting reduction in the quality of education for the
majority might constitute a sufficiently compelling justification for
a district's failure to provide such a costly program for the minority.
In addition, a child entering a school as one of a small linguistic
minority is far less likely to live in an isolated neighborhood or
community. His exposure to English outside of school might well
overcome any language barrier.91
A cultural monist would probably agree with Justice Black-
mun's concern with "numbers": reinforcing cultural identity is per-
haps appropriate when large numbers of minority members live
together, but not when the minority child is living in a majority
community. The child in the latter situation will blend into and
be accepted by the community by learning and adopting the cultural
norms of the majority.92
Upon close examination, however, Justice Blackmun's posi-
tion is untenable. Title VI 93 is meant to insure that federal funds
are spent to aid minorities as well as Anglos. The literal language
of the statute is seemingly unconcerned with quantification of the
deprivation, but instead reads, "[n]o person shall . .. be subjected
to discrimination." 94 In addition, Title VI simply restricts the
spending of supplemental federal funds. If a school district feels
financially overburdened by bilingual education requirements, it
can simply refuse the federal funds and thereby free itself of the
statute's restrictions.
95
Finally, regardless of the number of minority children in a
district, depriving any child of an education creates a harm for the
90 Serna v. Portales Municipal Schools, 499 F.2d 1147, 1154 (1oth Cir. 1974);
Otero v. Mesa County Valley School Dist. No. 51, 408 F. Supp. 162, 169 (D. Colo.
1975), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 568 F.2d 1312 (1oth Cr. 1978).
91 Even a small number of minority peers may, however, encourage linguistic
isolation.
In areas populated by only a few minorities, a pluralist model, as defined by
Kjolseth, see note 21 supra, would be particularly difficult to implement because its
goal is the use of two languages in community activities. Search for less costly
alternatives to bilingual education is particularly appropriate, therefore, when bi-
lingual classes would have only few non-English speaking students.
92 Assimilation may well prove difficult, however, if impeded by language
barriers.
93 Section 601, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976).
94 Section 601, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976).
95 Id. § 2000d-1.
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individual the ramifications of which may well extend throughout
his life. In fact, in a community with few minorities, denying an
education to a minority child arguably produces more serious psy-
chological damage because his competency in a foreign language
is of little comfort when he has no peers with whom to communi-
cate. Educating those children might thus be more important than
providing additional education to a greater number of Anglos.
The HEW Task Force,96 perhaps having made that value judgment,
has declared that Title VI is applicable to individual cases: "a dis-
trict does have an obligation to serve any student whose primary or
home language is other than English." 97
The cultural pluralist would agree that linguistic and cultural
reinforcement is especially critical for isolated children. If society
is to be enriched by variations in traditions and values, minorities
must maintain their cultures and languages. In a community with
little minority representation, special effort is necessary to preserve
and develop these cultures and Anglo contact with them.
c. Remedies
An additional problem with applying Lau v. Nichols 98 is the
generality of the discussion of remedies. The Court simply said:
No specific remedy is urged upon us. Teaching English
to the students of Chinese ancestry who do not speak the
language is one choice. Giving instructions to this group in
Chinese is another. There may be others. Petitioners
ask only that the Board of Education be directed to apply
its expertise to the problem and rectify the situation.9"
Although leaving the choice of remedy to the school district's dis-
cretion temporarily restricts the necessary judicial intervention,
school districts and lower courts are left with little guidance regard-
ing which remedies are sufficient both to meet the linguistic needs
of students and to comply with all legal requirements. The Tenth
Circuit has read Lau as requiring bilingual-bicultural education,100
while the Ninth has held that other types of remedial programs
may satisfy a district's Title VI obligations.10'
96 HEW Task Force Findings, supra note 87.
97 Id. 4.
98414 U.S. 563 (1974).
99 Id. 564-65.
100 Serna v. Portales Munic. Schools, 499 F.2d 1147, 1154 (10th Cir. 1974).
101 Guadalupe Org., Inc. v. Tempe Elem. School Dist. No. 3, 587 F.2d 1022,
1029-30 (9th Cir. 1978).
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HEW has not been as deferential to school board preferences.
The agency requires a bilingual program or its equivalent-perhaps
an individual tutorial program-in all school districts with linguistic
minority school children.1 2 HEW's 1975 Task Force Findings set
forth several alternatives: a Transitional Bilingual Education Pro-
gram; a Bilingual/Bicultural Program; and a Multilingual/Multi-
cultural Program.
03
The Transitional Bilingual Education Program (TBE) and
the Bilingual/Bicultural Program are very similar except that,
under the former, a student is no longer entitled to further instruc-
tion in his native language once he is fully proficient in English.
The Bilingual/Bicultural Program, on the contrary, is a mainten-
ance model, continuing to develop skills in the student's native
language and culture in addition to teaching English. The pro-
gram's goal is proficiency in both languages. The Multilingual/
Multicultural Program is identical to the Bilingual/Bicultural Pro-
gram except that the former teaches more than one language, in
addition to English.
All three programs include a cultural component, "intro-
ducing, maintaining, and developing all the necessary skills" 104
in both language and culture. 0 5 HEW's requirement that the
minority culture be maintained and developed is a major ex-
tension of Lau, which spoke only of linguistic obstacles to learning.
The agency's attitude toward the cultural component is unclear-
whether it is necessary for effective education or simply a helpful
addition to a bilingual program. This aspect of the programs is
extremely controversial because it strengthens cultural differences
and thereby discourages the adoption of Anglo cultural norms.10
A school district's choice between maintenance and transition
models is likely to be influenced by its social values.'0 7 A district
adhering to a pluralistic view of integration and hoping to foster
mutual appreciation among groups by exposing each group to the
1
0 2 The Ninth Circuit surprisingly made no reference to the HEW Task Force
Findings, supra note 87, in Guadalupe Org., Inc. v. Tempe Elem. School Dist. No.
3, 587 F.2d 1022 (9th Cir. 1978).
103 HEW Task Force Findings, supra note 87, at 6.
104 Id. 21.
105 For summary descriptions of the three programs, see id.
106 The cultural aspect of bilingual programs often attracts English speaking
minority students to the program. See text accompanying notes 191-94 infra. Con-
gress has included a cultural component in federally funded bilingual programs.
See Bilingual Education Act, §§ 701-751, 20 U.S.C. §§ 3221-3261 (Supp. 1979);
[1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4148.
107 See notes 11-28 supra & accompanying text.
BILINGUAL EDUCATION
culture of the other will tend to favor a maintenance model. Main-
tenance models are also most effective in preserving minority cul-
tural norms and teaching multiple language skills to both minority
and majority students.,"' On the other hand, a school board advocat-
ing cultural monism will hurry to return minority children to a
monolingual class as quickly as possible 10 9 and will be disinclined
to accept a bilingual program designed to teach a new language and
culture to Anglo students. HEW's acceptance of both models
allows school districts the choice according to their own values.110
The scope of a school district's choice of remedies is thus un-
clear-HEW requires some form of bilingual-bicultural education,
while Lau arguably affords greater discretion to the individual
districts.
2. The Equal Educational Opportunity Act of 1974
Although Title V 111 may not have been intended to require
school districts to remedy those disparate impacts of its educational
system not caused by deliberate design,112 Congress quickly affirmed
its support for Lau v. Nichols113 by enacting section 1703(f) of the
Equal Educational Opportunity Act of 1974.114 The Act requires
school districts "to take appropriate action to overcome language
barriers that impede equal participation by its students in its in-
structional programs." n5 The language of the Act thus explicitly
mandates remedial assistance to students of limited English speaking
ability, even when their need for such assistance is not the result of
intentional discrimination.
116
108 See notes 21-22 supra & accompanying text.
109 See note 13 supra & accompanying text.
110 HEW does not, however, regard their acceptance of the TBE model as an
implicit authorization of segregation:
The implementation of the aforementioned educational models do not
justify the existence of racially/ethnically isolated or identifiable classes, per
se. Since there is no conflict in this area as related to the application of
the Emergency School Aid Act (ESAA) and existing Title VI regulations,
standard application of those regulations is effective.
HEW Task Force Findings, supra note 87, at 18. For a further discussion of the
requirement that bilingual classes be integrated, see notes 150-213 infra & accom-
panying text.
111 Section 601, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976).
112 See notes 67-68 supra & accompanying text.
113414 U.S. 563 (1974).
114 Section 204, 20 U.S.C. § 1703(f) (1978). The Act provides: "No State
shall deny equal educational opportunity to an individual on account of his or her
race, color, sex, or national origin .... Id. § 1703.
115 Id. § 1703(f).
116 TWO courts have thus held that the prohibitions of the Equal Education
Opportunity Act of 1974, §§ 202-223, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1721 (1978), go beyond
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Just as Title VI and Lau left remedial choices to the discretion
of the school district,117 so too section 1703 (f) does not indicate
what constitutes "appropriate action." The Ninth Circuit held
in Guadalupe Organization, Inc. v. Tempe Elementary School Dis-
trict No. 3 118 that programs not offering bilingual-bicultural edu-
cation may be sufficient to satisfy the statute's requirements. Absent
clear legislative intent to limit school board flexibility to experi-
ment with new programs, Guadalupe is correct. Like Title VI,
however, section 1703 (f) does not resolve questions of effectiveness
of remedies," 9 applicability to small numbers of students,'120 and
required degree of English language proficiency. Although the
same policy considerations discussed above with regard to Title VI
also apply here, HEW does not have explicit authority to enforce
those of the Constitution. United States v. Hinds County School Board, 560 F.2d
619, 623-24 (5th Cir. 1977); Martin Luther King Elem. School Children v. Michi-
gan Bd. of Educ., 463 F. Supp. 1027, 1031-32 (E.D. Mich. 1978); see Deerfield
Hutterian Ass'n v. Ipswich Bd. of Educ., 444 F. Supp. 159, 163 (D.S.D. 1978).
The court in Martin Luther King based its finding that discriminatory intent is not
a necessary element of a § 1703(f) violation in part on Title VI, § 601, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000d (1976), and on Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974), a questionable
conclusion after Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). See
note 83 & text accompanying note 63 supra. Following Bakke, however, a sub-
sequent decision in Martin Luther King found a § 1703(f) violation despite ab-
sence of discriminatory motive and constitutional violation. Martin Luther King
Elem. School Children v. Michigan Bd. of Educ., No. 7-71861 (E.D. Mich. July
12, 1979). This district court obviously feels that, despite the comparison between
§ 1703 and Title VI in the earlier opinion, the Equal Education Opportunity Act
of 1974 does impose more stringent restrictions than does the Constitution.
Although the Supreme Court has recently been reluctant to find discrimination
in the absence of improper motives, see note 60 supra & accompanying text, this
measure was passed with a striking absence of controversy. The Equal Educational
Opportunity Act of 1974, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1721 (1978), was introduced during
floor debate as an amendment to the Education Act of 1974. 120 CONG. REC.
14812 (1974); see also Guadalupe Org., Inc. v. Tempe Elem. School Dist. No. 3,
587 F.2d 1022, 1030 (9th Cir. 1978). Congress was concerned chiefly with the
portion of those amendments limiting transportation of students to achieve racial
balance. Section 1703(f), however, remained unnoticed. In accepting § 1703(f)
under the rubric of equal educational opportunity, Congress apparently endorsed
the implication in Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974), that equal rights for
minorities requires remedial education. Senator Montoya, one of the sponsors
of the 1974 amendment, commented, "[slo we know now [after Lau], that the
civil rights of these minority children are involved." 120 CONG. REc. 15090 (1974).
1 1 7 See notes 98-99 supra & accompanying text.
118 587 F.2d 1022 (9th Cir.) (1978).
11 9 One court has indicated that a remedial program under 20 U.S.C. § 1703(f)
(1978) must include subject matter as well as language instruction. Cintron v.
Brentwood Union Free School Dist., 455 F. Supp. 57, 63 (E.D.N.Y. 1978). See
also note 71 supra.
120 The Sixth Circuit has held that the statute is violated if even one person
is denied an equal education opportunity. United States v. School Dist. of Fern-
dale, 577 F.2d 1339, 1345 (6th Cir. 1978).
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section 1708 (f), and their regulations requiring bilingual educa-
don 12 thus carry no great weight in interpreting that provision.
Although Lau reads Title VI as requiring remedial education
for linguistic minorities, the scope and form of that duty must still
be clarified. HEW has ordered some type of bilingual-bicultural
education even when the number of students affected is not great
and the deprivation of education not complete. The federal courts,
on the other hand, have not been so strict in applying Title VI,
and, after Regents of the University of California v. Bakke2-2 the
impact of the statute may be no different from that of the Consti-
tution. Section 1703 (f), on the other hand, extends beyond the
Constitution, though the scope of the duty it imposes to provide
bilingual education is also unclear.
B. The Constitutional Requirements
Because the Supreme Court relied exclusively in Lau v.
Nichols 123 on Title VI "A to require remedial programs for non-
English speaking students,u 5 it had no need to determine whether the
Constitution also mandates remedial education. The merits of two
possible constitutional arguments will be explored in the following
discussion. The first has been rejected by two federal courts; 120
nevertheless, a school district's choice of a program of instruction
sensitive to the needs of only English speaking students is arguably
discriminatory and subject to an equal protection attack. Second,
such a choice may result in an unconstitutional denial of education
to a segment of the student population. The following discussion
explores the merits of both arguments.
The equal protection attacks on desegregation 12 provide an
appropriate starting point to evaluate the potentially discriminatory
practice of teaching non-English speaking students only in English.
Where segregation is not the result of facially discriminatory classi-
fications, a strict standard of judicial review is triggered only if
plaintiffs demonstrate intent by the state to segregate a suspect
121 HEW Task Force Findings, supra note 87. See notes 86-87, 96-97, 102-06
supra & accompanying text.
122438 U.S. 265 (1978).
123414 U.S. 563 (1974).
124 Section 601, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976).
125 See notes 77-82 supra & accompanying text.
126 Guadalupe Org., Inc. v. Tempe Elem. School Dist. No. 3, 587 F.2d 1022
(9th Cir. 1978); Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 521 F.2d 465, 482-83 (1975), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1066 (1976).
2 7 See notes 55-64 supra & accompanying text.
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class.' 28 The Supreme Court appears to favor extending to ethnic
minorities the suspect class status traditionally applied to racial
minorities. 29 Linguistically disadvantaged minority students are
thus entitled to maximum protection under the equal protection
clause. Before this protection can be invoked to attack a school
district's decision to teach classes only in English, however, the plain-
tiffs must prove preliminarily that the decision creates a classification
at all.
A state offering all students the same instruction does not appear
to be classifying students. The absence of an overt classification
should not, however, end the inquiry. Just as classifications can be
based on irrelevant characteristics, so services can be shaped un-
necessarily to the detriment of one of the recipient groups. The
equal protection clause may properly be applied to scrutinize a
state's choice of a program tailored to meet the needs of only the
majority. 30  A school district's choice to offer instruction only in
English to all students required to attend public school is a selec-
tion among the various alternative forms of education. This selec-
tion is the functional equivalent of a nonfacial discriminatory
classification and should thus be subjected to equal protection
analysis.18'
1
2 8 See note 60 supra & accompanying text.
1
2 9 In Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954), the Supreme Court held that
Mexican-Americans constitute an identifiable class for purposes of analysis under
the fourteenth amendment. See United States v. Texas, 342 F. Supp. 24, 26-27
(E.D. Tex. 1971), aff'd, 466 F.2d 518 (5th Cir. 1972). For an extended dis-
cussion of the argument that linguistic minorities are a suspect class, see Corn-
ment, The Constitutional Right of Bilingual Children to an Equal Education Op-
portunity, 47 S. CAL. L. REv. 943, 979-85 (1974). But ef. Martin Luther King
Elem. School Children v. Michigan Bd. of Educ., 451 F. Supp. 1324, 1328 (E.D.
Mich. 1978) (plaintiffs, though all black, not suspect class because characteristics
involved-cultural, economic, and social deprivation-are not suspect).
130 This analysis is distinct from the usual effects analysis, rejected in Washing-
ton v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). There, the objective benefit given to one
group, employment in the police force, was denied to another. The analysis pro-
posed here is to be used when the objective benefits given to all are identical.
See Grubb, Breaking the Language Barrier: The Right to Bilingual Education, 9
HAzy. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 52, 71-81 (1974).
131 Suppose, for example, that a town, wishing to install street curbs to pro-
tect pedestrians from cars, had the option of building high or low curbs. The
former would provide a barrier to handicapped persons, the latter would not. The
choice of high curbs would be a selection. All persons would theoretically re-
ceive the same objective benefits of curbs, but, in reality, only non-handicapped
individuals would be able to use them. Recognition that a state can discriminate
by its choice of services as well as by its classifications of recipients of those serv-
ices would have led to a different analysis in Guadalupe Org., Inc. v. Tempe Elem.
School Dist. No. 3, 587 F.2d 1022 (9th Cir. 1978). In examining the claim that
bilingual education is required by the equal protection clause, see notes 14-15 supra
& accompanying text, the court there employed the lowest level of scrutiny, the
rational relation test, and upheld the school's remedial programs. Citing San An-
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Proving a discriminatory motive for this classification is a much
more formidable obstacle. Under Washington v. Davis,132 a plain-
tiff must demonstrate that the school district intended to treat
majority and minority groups differently and provided services in a
manner designed to exclude minorities. In the ordinary case, how-
ever, the possibility of success is rather slim. Use of English likely
reflects to a large extent a long-standing national desire to use a
common language without any discriminatory intent.133 Refusal to
alter established practices to meet the particular needs of minorities
is not itself indicative of discriminatory intent.13
4
The strongest case for linguistically disadvantaged plaintiffs
would occur if a school board refused to provide instruction in a
language other than English because of a desire not to teach minority
students. Racial or ethnic animus is an improper motive for any
state action. 35 More difficult problems of proof would arise if, in
anticipation of non-English speaking students entering the district,
a school board ordered that instruction be in English. This action,
a deliberate selection of a program beneficial to only a segment of
tonio Indep. School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), the Ninth Circuit
held that a rational relation to a legitimate state interest is absent only when a
school board completely denies the opportunity to learn basic skills. Guadalupe
Org., Inc., 587 F.2d at 1026.
The court refused to invoke the strict scrutiny standard because no suspect
classification existed: "[ilnasmuch as appellees only differentiate explicitly among
students with respect to the provisions of remedial English instruction, no such
claim is possible." Id. 1022, 1026 n.3. The court found the strict scrutiny test in-
appropriate also because no fundamental right was involved. Id. 1026; see note
142 infra. The Guadalupe court implied that strict scrutiny would not be applied
in the absence of some other classification; yet the court did recognize a selection
in "[t]he decision of the appellees to offer the educational program attacked by ap-
pellants." Guadalupe Org., Inc., 587 F.2d at 1027. The court was apparently
willing to scrutinize this selection and thus should not have excluded automatically
the possibility of invoking strict scrutiny if discriminatory intent could have been
shown. If the need for special protection of minorities is sufficient to trigger strict
judicial scrutiny of a classification, the standard should be no less exacting for more
subtle forms of discrimination.
132 426 U.S. 229 (1976). See note 60 supra & accompanying text.
133 This goal of having all children speak English is constitutionally permissible.
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401 (1923).
134 See Guadalupe Org., Inc. v. Tempe Elem. School Dist. No. 3, 587 F.2d 1022,
1028-29 (9th Cir. 1978). Persistence in a neighborhood school policy, for exam-
ple, is not necessarily indicative of improper motivation, even if neighborhood
housing segregation leads to racial separation in schools. Dayton Bd. of Educ. v.
Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406 (1977). But see Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 47
U.S.L.W. 4944, 4947 (U.S. July 2, 1979) (No. 78-627) (use of optional attend-
ance zones is at least perpetuation of dual school system and thus violation of af-
firmative duty to eradicate effects of past discrimination); note 136 infra & accom-
panying text.
135 See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
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the student population, would have the foreseeable effect of denying
a meaningful education to minorities. The foreseeability of dis-
parate impact is relevant evidence to prove forbidden purpose.136
The intent, however, might be not to harm minorities, but rather
to ensure that a common language is spoken in the schools. If
the action is timed to coincide with the arrival of a minority group,
ethnic animus might thereby properly be inferred.13 7 In most
circumstances, however, proving discriminatory intent will be an
insurmountable obstacle.
If discriminatory intent is shown, courts will then invoke the
strict scrutiny standard. The state will have the difficult burden of
proving that using only English as the language of instruction bears
a necessary relation to a compelling state interest. If the state
asserts as a goal teaching English to all students, bilingual or tu-
torial programs could accomplish this while better helping students
to learn other subject areas138 and while avoiding the feelings of in-
feriority generated in non-English speaking children from offering
instruction only in English.13 9 Even if use of English for non-
English speaking students is rational in light of this goal, it is cer-
tainly not necessary to a compelling state interest.
A linguistically disadvantaged student may also want to argue
that selection of a program of instruction only in English is uncon-
stitutional as a complete denial of education to a segment of the
student population. Some support for this argument may be found
in the school finance case, San Antonio Independent School Dis-
trict v. Rodriguez. 40 Rodriguez involved a challenge to the use in
Texas of local property taxes to finance public education. The
plaintiffs claimed that the system discriminated against districts with
small revenue bases because those districts had greater difficulty
than richer districts in raising revenue.' 4' Although the Supreme
Court held that education is not a fundamental constitutional
13 6 Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 47 U.S.L.W. 4924, 4928 (U.S. July 2,
1979) (No. 78-610). See note 194 infra. The foreseeability test should be an
important one, given that the cases that established the intent requirement, e.g.,
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), did not involve actions the segregative
impact of which was inevitable.
137 See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429
U.S. 252, 267 (1977).
'1
3 8 See notes 47-54 supra & accompanying text.
139 Serna v. Portales Municipal Schools, 499 F.2d 1147, 1150 (10th Cir. 1974).
140411 U.S. 1 (1973).
141 Id. 27.
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right,'1 it left open the possibility that completely denying educa-
tion to some children might be constitutionally impermissible.143
Placing linguistic minorities in classrooms in which English is
the only language of instruction may constitute a total deprivation.
In Lau v. Nichols, the Supreme Court found that non-English speak-
ing students denied remedial instruction in English were "fore-
closed from any meaningful education." 144 Here, however, the
deprivation is not the result of less money or services devoted to the
education of minority children, as was the case in Rodriguez. On
the contrary, all students receive exactly the same objective benefits.
The difference in students' abilities to understand English creates
the inequality. Rodriguez, however, does not purport to define
exclusively a total deprivation and therefore does not foreclose the
possibility that an unconstitutional absolute denial may result from
such subjective differences.145
142 Id. 35. Following this decision, the Ninth Circuit refused to recognize a
fundamental right to education and therefore to apply a strict scrutiny standard in
Guadalupe Org., Inc. v. Tempe Elem. School Dist. No. 3, 587 F.2d 1022, 1027
(9th Cir. 1978).
143 San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 36-37 (1973).
The Court applied a rational relation test in examining differences in educational
benefits, id. 40, and held that the Texas legislature could rationally decide to base
school financing on local property taxes, even if the result was disparities among
school districts in educational resources. Id. 54-55. The Court did not purport,
however, to deal with the situation of "an absolute denial of educational opportuni-
ties." Id. 37. For an extended analysis of the implications of Rodriguez, see
Foster, supra note 11, at 158.
144414 U.S. 563, 566 (1974). Although the Court did not reach the consti-
tutional issue, its finding that plaintiffs were denied any meaningful education is
relevant to the constitutional question of defining a total deprivation.
145 Perhaps the closest the Supreme Court has come to mandating subjectively
equal services is in the criminal procedure area. For example, appellants unable
to afford a transcript for appeal may have the cost defrayed by the state. Griffin
v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); see Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971);
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963). Just as the state must provide special
financing to open its appellate system to those otherwise denied access, so it arguably
must provide a special program to open its educational system to those otherwise
denied access. The Supreme Court has recognized the importance of education,
San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973); Brown v.
Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954), and perhaps subjective differences
among pupils as well as defendants should be taken into account.
On the other hand, this case does differ from Griffin. First, the government
was acting in Griffin to deprive the defendant of liberty. Although minority
schoolchildren are seriously affected by inadequate education services, see notes
179-83 infra & accompanying text, the magnitude of the two harms is arguably
different.
Second, the criminal defendants in Griffin were unable to obtain a benefit-
the appeal-because of a financial barrier. Once an appeal without cost was
permitted, the objective services given rich and poor defendants were identical.
In this case minority children are unable to obtain a benefit because of a language
barrier. In remedying the linguistic obstacle, the entire educational benefit must
be reshaped-the objective services required are different. A considerable exten-
sion of Griffln is thus necessary to create a right to compensatory education.
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Even if non-English speaking students are able to show that
teaching only in English unconstitutionally deprives them of a
meaningful education, they must still demonstrate the appropriate-
ness of the requested remedy. The "but for" requirement of Day-
ton Board of Education v. Brinkman 146 creates problems of proof
for plaintiffs in all cases, but ascertaining how a school district would
be operating absent a constitutional violation is especially difficult
in those involving non-English speaking students. Suppose, for ex-
ample, an expensive tutorial program were rejected because school
board members did not wish to educate non-English speaking stu-
dents, a clear case of ethnic animus. Absent this discriminatory in-
tent, the plan would likely have been rejected nonetheless because of
its expense. A district court is not empowered to order that such a
program be implemented, nor may it desigo a program of its own.
147
The hypothetical "but for" situation is a matter of conjecture in the
desegregation cases; when failure to institute a bilingual program is
the source of the discrimination, judicial reasoning must be even
more clairvoyant. 148
Although HEW has imposed a duty under Tide VI to provide
bilingual-bicultural education, that requirement is suspect given
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,149 and the Con-
stitution may not afford any better claim for relief by linguistic mi-
norities. An equal protection challenge will likely encounter in-
superable problems in proving discriminatory intent, though, if that
burden is met, the school district will have difficulty justifying the
discrimination. Minority students may be more successful in argu-
ing an unconstitutional deprivation of education. Though Rodri-
guez arguably leaves open the issue, the courts will have to recognize
a duty on the part of the school districts to provide some education
and, correspondingly, the right of citizens to demand education.
Then "but for" problems may arise if the requested relief would
have been denied even absent the constitutional violation.
146433 U.S. 406 (1977). See notes 62-64 supra & accompanying text.
147A minority group which suspects its proposal will be rejected for constitu-
tionally impermissible reasons is thus faced with a tactical dilemma. It could, on
the one hand, ask for the most feasible program it would find acceptable. If this
plan were then rejected for an impermissible reason, a district court would have
power to give the minority group the requested relief. If, on the other hand, the
group sought too much, showing that the improper motivation was the "but for"
cause of the plan's rejection would be difficult.
14 8 See notes 64 supra & accompanying text.
149 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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V. THE DUTY TO INTEGRATE BILINGUAL CLASSROOMS
The constitutional duty not to separate students deliberately
and the duty imposed by HEW to provide bilingual education 150
have had dramatic impact on the structure of educational services;
a requirement that bilingual classes be integrated would, however,
necessitate additional readjustment. The lack of clarity in the
statutes and HEW regulations concerning this important issue,
perhaps due to its political volatility, has focused attention on con-
stitutional requirements. Just as desegregation and bilingual edu-
cation plans lay dormant until sparked by Supreme Court man-
dates, so integrated bilingual education may occur only if ordered
by the Court.
A. The Statutes
The federal statutes do not clearly address the issue of inte-
gration of bilingual education. The Bilingual Education Act z51
permits inclusion of Anglos in bilingual programs, though they may
not constitute greater than forty percent of the class.' 52 The Act
does not, however, seem to require this integration.
Title VI leaves undefined the term "discrimination," 153 per-
haps the key word in the statute. Moreover, that statute is unclear
whether individuals are "excluded from" 154 a program when they
participate in a separate, optional program. The very issue here is
whether a separate program "discriminates."
Although the Equal Educational Opportunity Act of 1974 15'
provides that "[n]o State shall deny equal education opportunity...
by . . . the failure by an educational agency to take appropriate
action to overcome language barriers that impede equal participa-
tion by its students in its instructional programs," 156 the Act does
not define the parameters of "appropriate action." The statutes
thus require remedial programs, but provide no indication of con-
gressional intent regarding the appropriate racial composition of the
bilingual classroom.
B. HEW Regulations
The HEW regulations, providing no more guidance than do
the applicable statutes, can only be described as inconclusive. Pro-
150 See notes 102-10 supra & accompanying text.
151 Sections 701-751, 20 U.S.C. §§ 3221-3261 (Supp. 1979).
152 Id. § 3223(a) (4) (B).
1 3 Section 601, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976).
'5 Id.
'55 Sections 201-223, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1721 (1978).
166 Id. §§ 1703, 1703 (f).
19791
1592 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 127:1564
mulgated under the Bilingual Education Act, 57 the Emergency
School Aid Act,1 8 and Title VI,159 the regulations decide the issue
in all possible ways, leaving a school board unable to decipher their
true meaning. By complying with one regulation, a school district
is vulnerable to termination of its funds pursuant to another regu-
lation. The dilemma is truly preplexing.
The regulations promulgated under the Bilingual Education
Act give a district the option of including Anglos if space is avail-
able and if they wish to be included. One such regulation reads:
A program of bilingual education may make provision for
the voluntary enrollment to a limited degree therein, on a
regular basis, of children of other than limited English-
speaking ability, in order that they may acquire an under-
standing of the cultural heritage of the children of limited
English-speaking ability for whom the particular program
of bilingual education is designed. In determining eligi-
bility to participate in such programs, priority shall be
given to children of limited English-speaking ability. In
no event shall the program be designed for the purpose of
teaching a foreign language to English-speaking children. 60
This regulation clearly leaves Anglo participation in federally
funded bilingual education to the discretion of the district and thus
permits segregated bilingual programs.
The regulations pursuant to the Emergency School Aid Act
(ESAA) take a contrary approach. Classroom segregation of mi-
nority students for more than twenty-five percent of the day is pro-
hibited,161 thereby invalidating most segregated bilingual programs.
Although an exemption is provided for "bona fide ability group-
ing," 162 the exemption covers only groupings "which, in the case
of national origin minority group children, do not essentially meas-
ure English language skills." 163 Moreover, the regulations ex-
plicitly prohibit discrimination on the basis of language or cultural
background. 6" Although this prohibition can be read to bar only
classes not specially sensitive to the language needs of students,
another subsection of this regulation creates a presumption that
157 Sections 701-751, 20 U.S.C. §§ 3221-3261 (Supp. 1979).
158 Sections 601-617, 20 U.S.C. §§ 3191-3207 (Supp. 1979).
159 Section 601, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (1976).
160 45 C.F.R. § 123.02 (g) (2) (i) (1978).
16145 C.F.R. § 185.43(c) (1977).
162 Id.
163 Id. § 185.43(c) (1).
164 Id. § 185.43(d) (2).
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racially identifiable classes not justifiable as bona fide ability group-
ings are assignments on the basis of race, color, or national origin.1 5
ESAA thus prohibits segregated bilingual education. 160
Title VI regulations provide no answer to this conflict. In-
stead, they simply increase the risk-a Title VI violation may result
in termination of all federal funds.167 The regulations do not indi-
cate whether classrooms segregated for bilingual purposes have the
"effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination" 168 or imper-
missibly exclude persons. 169 The clarifying memorandum, focusing
on the discriminatory effect of heterogeneous classrooms with in-
struction only in English, 70 provides no aid in determining the legal-
ity of segregated bilingual classrooms. The answer to whether bi-
lingual classrooms must be integrated must therefore be found in
some other source.
C. Constitutional Considerations
A fourteenth amendment violation will more likely be found
when students are segregated for purposes of bilingual education
than when they are taught in an integrated environment. Racially
identifiable bilingual classrooms manifestly classify and separate
minorities, and their constitutionality may well depend on the type
of bilingual program and on the characteristics or allegations of the
plaintiff students. In most cases, however, plaintiffs will at least
265 Id. § 185.43(d) (5).
166 The Office of Civil Rights (OCR) has so interpreted the ESAA regulations:
"[HEW's] policy, then, as expressed in the ESAA regulations it has promulgated, is
that ESAA prohibits the racial or ethnic isolation or segregation of children on the
basis of English language ability for any substantial portion of the school day," that
is, more than twenty-five percent of the day. Memorandum on Desegregation and
Isolation of Minorities from P. Jacobo, Assistant Regional Attorney, Region VI, OCR,
to Lau Task Force Members (Apr. 3, 1975). A dispute over racially identifiable
classrooms in La Junta, Colorado, prompted an OCR investigation. Finding a
substandard program in operation, OCR properly denied ESAA funding on that basis,
without reaching the segregation issue. Letter from H. Goldberg, Associate Com-
missioner of Education, to S. Roberts, Superintendent of Schools (June 21, 1977).
Recently OCR alleged that the La Junta program violated Title VI, § 601, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000d (1976), because of program deficiencies. Notice of Opportunity for Hear-
ing, East Otero School Dist. No. R-1, Dept. of HEW Docket No. 79-VI-5 (June 25,
1979). Moreover, the allegations reiterated OCR's position that substantial segrega-
tion is not permissible: the district was cited for failing to assign minority students
on the basis of bona fide ability groupings, id. 9, and for discouraging nonminority
enrollment, id. 12. Because the district is operating an optional program open to
all students, the OCR position strikes the proper policy balance. See notes 189-213
infra & accompanying text.
167 Section 602, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1976).
168 Regulation A, 45 C.F.R. § 803(b) (2) (1978). See text accompanying note
66 supra.
169 Title VI, § 601, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976). See note 65 supra.
170 1970 Memorandum, supra note 80.
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be able to demonstrate the first essential element of a prima facie
case, a deliberate classification according to minority status.
171
1. Mandatory Bilingual Programs Limited to Minority Students
The most extreme type of bilingual program would segregate
non-English speaking minority students by force of law. Although
no program currently in operation requires minority attendance, 17 -
examination of such a program is important for analytic purposes.
If a school board forces non-English speaking minorities into
separate classrooms, the facial nature of the classification and the
resulting segregation would normally trigger strict judicial scru-
tiny.173 A bilingual program designed to correct the inequality
existing in monolingual classrooms may arguably be entitled,
however, to a less exacting standard because of its remedial purpose.
Four Justices accepted a similar argument in Regents of the Univer-
sity of California v. Bakke 174 and thus employed an intermediate
level test in examining the school's admissions policy of reserving
spaces for minority applicants. The Justices thus required the chal-
lenged policy to "'serve important government objectives and [to]
be substantially related to achievement of those objectives.'" 17r
Even accepting the views of these Justices, forced separation
of linguistically disadvantaged students warrants application of a
strict standard of scrutiny. These students, in contrast to Bakke,
are members of a suspect class and are therefore entitled to maximum
protection under the equal protection clause.17  The immediate
result of such a mandatory program is segregation, precisely the
opposite effect of race conscious remedies.
177
171 Cf. notes 130-32 supra & accompanying text (offering instruction only in
English as a classification). Desegregation must be accomplished in classrooms as
well as schools. The harms of intentional state segregation are the same at both
levels. The Supreme Court has supported this view by treating identically inter-
district and intradistrict segregation. See Milhiken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
The Fifth Circuit has specifically held that classroom racial segregation is proscribed.
McNeal v. Tate County School Dist., 508 F.2d 1017, 1019 (5th Cir. 1975).
172 Some school districts may, however, have coerced minorities to enroll in bi-
lingual programs through their administration of the program. See notes 191-94
infra & accompanying text.
173 See notes 57-58 & 129 supra & accompanying text
174438 U.S. 265 (1978).
175 Id. 359 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dis-
senting in part) (quoting Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 317 (1977)). Justice
Powell, however, would apply a strict level of scrutiny to all racial and ethnic
classifications. Id. 291-99 (Powell, J.).
176 See note 129 supra & accompanying text.
177 See, e.g., United Jewish Org. of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144
(1977) (upholding race conscious reapportionment plan to enhance voting strength
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This separation creates harms of stigma and loss of contact with
Anglo peers.178 Classification according to English language profici-
ency stigmatizes minority schoolchildren by implying that they can-
not be taught in the same classrooms as English speaking students. 7 9
The Court in Brown v. Board of Education found that school segre-
gation "generates [in minority students] a feeling of inferiority as to
their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds
in a way unlikely ever to be undone." 180 This effect is not miti-
gated even by providing superior services to the segregated minority
group.'8 ' Stigma may occur even in the absence of ethnic animus
by the very perception of discriminatory intent. -82 Separation may
of minorities); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971)
(ordering race conscious student assignment to integrate schools).
178 This loss of contact not only decreases cultural exchange but may also create
adverse educational effects. See Goodman, De Facto School Segregation: A Consti-
tutional and Empirical Analysis, 60 CAL. L. REv. 275, 400-35 (1972).
179 See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 360 (1978)
(Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (citation
omitted) ("State programs designed ostensibly to ameliorate the effects of past racial
discrimination obviously create the same hazard of stigma, since they may promote
racial separatism and reinforce the views of those who believe that members of racial
minorities are inherently incapable of succeeding on their own."). Segregated pro-
grams may also have a stigmatizing impact by implying that the cultural identity
of a specially disadvantaged group cannot or should not be maintained in an inte-
grated environment. Cultural Pluralism, supra note 10, at 144.
180 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954). Although non-English speaking children may
not themselves feel as inferior as did the black students in Brown v. Board of Educ.,
id., segregating the former does create the alienating perception that the government
views them as inferior.
181 Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), focused primarily on the
harmful effects produced by separate educational facilities. The Court there com-
pared the quality of education received in segregated black schools with that received
in white schools. The general failure to evaluate possible adverse effects in cases
after Brown may reflect a presumption that such harm exists. The Court has not
hesitated, however, to examine alleged harmful effects in cases involving remedial
programs. E.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); United
Jewish Org. of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977); Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971). See Goodman, supra note
179, at 295-98, 400-35 (1972); Note, Reading the Mind of the School Board: Segre-
gative Intent and the De Facto/De Jure Distinction, 86 YALE L.J. 317, 346-49
(1976) [hereinafter cited as Reading the Mind of the School Board]. Cf. Ely, The
Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. Cm. L. REv. 723 (1974)
(advocating a less exacting standard of scrutiny when a minority is benefited rather
than harmed). For the proposition that state action abridging constitutional provi-
sions cannot be justified simply because it confers a benefit, see Goldberg v. Kelly,
397 U.S. 254 (1970); Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction
in Constitutional Law, 81 HAnv. L. IREv. 1439 (1968).
Although the Supreme Court has never specifically addressed this question, it
has always mandated integration as part of segregation remedies. See, e.g., Brown
v. Board of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294 (1955); Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken
f1), 433 U.S. 267 (1977).
182 See Reading the Mind of the School Board, supra note 181, at 347-48. The
perception may not, in fact, be far off the mark. See notes 191-94 infra & accom-
panying text.
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be viewed as indicative of the school board's aversion to integration.
Regardless of how courts treat claims of white students in situations
involving integration efforts with no danger of these harms, claims
of non-English speaking students are entitled to strict scrutiny. 8 3
A bilingual program may survive this scrutiny if the state can
successfully demonstrate a compelling state interest. Bilingual
education aids students whose language prevents their meaningful
participation in monolingual classrooms. Indeed, bilingual pro-
grams, by insuring that each student receives an education in a
language he can understand, accord with the fourteenth amend-
ment's emphasis on equality of treatment. Although the state may
be able to prove a compelling interest, mandatory bilingual pro-
grams limited to non-English speaking students do have a less re-
strictive alternative-simply making the programs voluntary and
integrated. 8 4
Anglo students excluded from a segregated bilingual program
may also allege a violation of their fourteenth amendment rights.
These students are denied both the opportunity to associate with
non-English speaking students and the linguistic and cultural bene-
fits of a bilingual program. Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke 'w
suggests that any program excluding persons on the basis of race
should be examined under the strict scrutiny test. 8 6 Just as Bakke
could not be excluded from a medical school simply because he was
white, so perhaps Anglos may not be excluded from a bilingual
program solely because they can speak English.
Although similar, Bakke's claim is more persuasive: exclusion
from the special admissions program effectively denied him a place
in medical school because he failed to qualify under the regular ad-
missions program. Segregated bilingual programs, however, deny
no one an education.'87 English speaking students must simply
183 See Guey Heung Lee v. Johnson, 404 U.S. 1215, 1217 (Douglas, Circuit
Justice, 1971) (quoting Johnson v. San Francisco Unified School Dist, 339 F. Supp.
1315, 1322 (N.D. Cal. 1971)) ("Bi-lingual classes are not proscribed. They may
be provided in any manner which does not create, maintain or foster segregation.").
184 A voluntary bilingual program open only to non-English speaking students
also has the same less restrictive alternative. For an analysis of the alternative, see
notes 189-213 infra & accompanying text.
185438 U.S. 265 (1978).
186 The precedential effect of Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, id., remains
uncertain. No constitutional standard was approved by the entire Court: four Jus-
tices used an intermediate level of scrutiny, id. 359 (Brennan, J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part), Justice Powell applied a strict scrutiny
test, id. 291-99 (Powell, J.), and the remaining members of the Court declined to
address the constitutional issue, id. 411-12 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
187 This distinction is of importance to Justice Powell. He regarded the racial
classification in Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke as suspect because it effectively
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attend monolingual classes. Though deprived of the extra lin-
guistic and cultural exposure of the bilingual classroom, these stu-
dents are affected less severely than was Bakke.
Furthermore, if the intermediate level of scrutiny applied by
four Justices in Bakke 8 1 prevails in suits brought by Anglos, the
segregated bilingual programs might withstand constitutional chal-
lenge. Nevertheless, the educational and associational harms suf-
fered by Anglo children should be sufficient to require a showing
by the state of the unavailability of a less restrictive alternative.
In any event, the likelihood of success of a constitutional challenge
to mandatory bilingual programs open only to minority students is
much greater if minority students are the plaintiffs.
2. Optional Bilingual Programs Open to All Students
A voluntary bilingual program open to all creates no facially
invidious classification. Students are not forcibly separated either
by their English language proficiency or by their ethnic minority
status, but rather by their own choice. The individual choices of
students or their parents might conceivably result in classrooms with
compositions reflecting the school's ethnic distribution. If not, 89
minority students could then allege that the separation violates the
state's duty not to segregate ethnic minorities.
Unlike mandatory programs, optional programs that accept all
students do not evince an intent to separate, in view of the classifica-
tion's facially neutral appearance. 190 By their very nature, of course,
bilingual programs are designed with minorities in mind. The
more difficult burden with regard to intent is showing that a school
board purposefully designed or administered the program to sep-
arate non-English speaking students from Anglos.
Certain aspects of a bilingual program, such as its curriculum
or methods of instruction, may reveal segregative intent. Because
excluded some individuals "from enjoyment of a state-provided benefit-admission
to Medical School-they otherwise would receive." 438 U.S. 265, 305 (1978)
(Powell, J.). Similarly, Justice Powell read Lau v. Nichols as turning on the denial
of "'a meaningful opportunity to participate in the educational program."' Id. 304
(quoting Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 568 (1974)). A high degree of deprivation
might also be crucial to finding an equal protection violation under an intermediate
level of scrutiny.
188 See notes 175-76 supra & accompanying text.
189 The AIR Study reported a high percentage of minority students in bilingual
classrooms. See notes 40 & 45 supra & accompanying text.
190 The discussion of discriminatory intent which follows arguably shows that
such a classification is not facially neutral. In light of the absence of explicit ethnic
criteria in the classification, the ethnic design of the programs is best discussed in
the context of intent. See notes 60-64 supra & accompanying text.
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bilingual programs are geared towards a minority language and cul-
ture 191 in terms of teaching techniques as well as subjects of instruc-
tion, they create an environment familiar to minority students and
somewhat similar to their home environments. This familiarity,
plus peer and family pressure, may induce minority children to
enroll in bilingual programs. If maintenance programs are in-
cluded in the bilingual curriculum, students, even after becoming
proficient in English, may not wish to transfer into monolingual
classrooms.192 The incentive to enroll and remain in bilingual
classes will be even more pronounced if no effort is made to adjust
monolingual classrooms to the needs of minorities. While minority
students are therefore attracted to bilingual programs, Anglos find
them unfamiliar.193 Anglos may also be dissuaded from enrolling
in a bilingual program for which foreign language proficiency is a
prerequisite or which is depicted as a minority program rather than
one of mutual enrichment. Discriminatory intent can thus be
inferred if a school seems deliberately to have made a voluntary bi-
lingual program unattractive to Anglos and, correspondingly, to
have left minorities with little choice but to enroll. 94
An optional bilingual program resembles the voluntary selec-
tion plans found unconstitutional in Green v. County School
Board 195 and Monroe v. Board of Commissioners.196 The Supreme
Court held in those cases that school districts with prior de jure
segregation were charged with an affirmative duty to take action to
191 Many existing bilingual programs have cultural components. See notes
104-05 supra & accompanying text.
192 These hypotheses have been supported by studies of the class composition
of current bilingual programs. See notes 39-45 supra & accompanying text.
193 Bilingual education thus differs from programs like black studies classes that
merely teach about minority culture.
194 Under the foreseeability test adopted by the Second, Fifth, and Sixth Cir-
cuits, race consciousness and disincentives for Anglo enrollment are clearly uncon-
stitutional. See, e.g., Arthur v. Nyquest, 573 F.2d 134, 141-43 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 99 S. Ct. 179 (1978); United States v. Texas Educ. Agency, 564 F.2d
162, 168 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 47 U.S.L.W. 3838 (U.S. July 2, 1979)
(No. 78-897); NAACP v. Lansing Bd. of Educ., 559 F.2d 1042, 1046-48 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 997 (1977); Morales v. Shannon, 516 F.2d 411 (5th
Cir. 1975). See also Armstrong v. O'Connell, 451 F. Supp. 817 (E.D. Wis.
1978). The foreseeability test has been persuasively criticized. E.g., Reading the
Mind of the School Board, supra note 181. But see Columbus Bd. of Educ. v.
Penick, 47 U.S.L.W. 4924, 4927-28 (U.S. July 2, 1979) (No. 78-610) (foresee-
ability effects standard may be used as one kind of proof of impermissible pur-
pose). The argument here, however, is that the segregative impact of voluntary
bilingual programs is not only foreseeable, but, in fact, planned.
295 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
196 391 U.S. 450 (1968).
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eliminate racial discrimination "root and branch": simply allowing
free transfer among schools was insufficient. 197
Just as optional integration did not validate the segregation in
Green, so it should not validate segregated bilingual programs. In
view of the minority-oriented linguistic and cultural techniques of
bilingual programs, segregative effects of even voluntary programs
should raise suspicions. 98  The harms of separation-stigma and
loss of contact with Anglos '99-may be as substantial when created
by voluntary bilingual education as when by mandatory programs.
Whether ethnic animus motivated the institution of the voluntary
program likewise may have no impact on the extent of these
effects.2 0
0
On the other hand, an optional bilingual program may in fact
be a good faith attempt to provide non-English speaking students
meaningful education and may thus have less of a stigmatizing
impact. For such programs, the remedial aspect should be con-
sidered in determining how important the state interest need be
to withstand constitutional challenge.
The state may allege the goal of providing meaningful educa-
tion to all students in a language they understand, admittedly a
compelling state interest.201 The least restrictive alternative re-
quirement, however, poses some problems.
The types of alternatives available depend upon the constitu-
tionality of providing non-English speaking students with instruction
only in English. If a state's constitutional duty to give all students
a meaningful education requires bilingual education, the effects of
a segregated bilingual program must be compared with those of an
integrated bilingual classroom. The resulting stigma is not offset
by educational gain because the comparison group is also a bilingual
classroom with identical educational benefits.
Alternatively, if a state may constitutionally eliminate bilingual
programs entirely, the appropriate comparison group would not be
197 Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 438, 441-42 (1968). The
Court stated further: "The burden on a school board today is to come forward with
a plan that promises realistically to work, and promises realistically to work now."
Id. 439 (emphasis in original).
298The sequence of events in Green, id., was different from that in a voluntary
bilingual program. In Green, the voluntary plan was intended to remedy prior
de jure segregation. By instituting voluntary bilingual education, a school district
is implementing simultaneously both the segregation and the voluntary remedy of
Green. This fact difference does not, however, make such bilingual programs any
more permissible.
199 See notes 179-83 supra & accompanying text.
20o See note 181 supra & accompanying text.
201 See text following note 183 supra.
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an integrated bilingual program, but rather an integrated classroom
offering instruction only in English. By choosing to offer instruc-
tion not required by the Constitution, the state has created an
additional option for the non-English speaking student. The edu-
cational advantage of bilingual instruction partly offsets this stigma,
at least for non-English speaking students. English speaking
minorities, fully capable of learning in a monolingual classroom,
may nevertheless feel compelled to participate in bilingual pro-
grams. For these persons, who, in fact, typically constitute the
plurality group in bilingual education today,202 the stigma of segre-
gation is not at all counterbalanced by educational benefits.
The state must therefore demonstrate another state interest
when optional bilingual education is challenged by English
speaking minorities. The state may allege that, in addition to pro-
viding remedial education, two other interests are served by such
programs: avoiding the educational harm to Anglos associated with
forcing them to enroll in a bilingual program and maximizing
individual enrollment choices. The former is admittedly a com-
pelling state interest. In light of the AIR study findings that
bilingual techniques can likely educate successfully a group of
students of varying linguistic abilities,20 3 the state will have a
difficult time proving that the education of Anglos would suffer
substantially in a bilingual classroom. The state cannot show,
therefore, that a segregated, though voluntary, bilingual program
bears a strong relation to its interest in quality education for
Anglos.
The state's interest in permitting students or parents to choose
for themselves bilingual or monolingual instruction presents a
closer question. Parents certainly have a substantial interest in
controlling the upbringing of their children, 04 and children may
have additional rights of their own.20 5  The state, however, may
202 See notes 40 & 43 supra & accompanying text.
203 See notes 47-54 supra & accompanying text. To facilitate integrated bi-
lingual instruction, educators have suggested techniques such as grouping students
according to linguistic ability for language instruction, maximizing individual in-
struction, using a team teaching approach, and employing sufficient bilingual re-
source teachers and aids for all classrooms. E.g., Cardenas, Bilingual Education,
Segregation, and a Third Alternative, 19 INEQUAI.I= IN EDUC. 19 (1975); BMr-
OuAL Uirr, CoLoRADo STATE DEPT. OF EDUCATION (1976). See Fern6ndez &
Guskin, supra note 9, at 14-15.
204 See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
205 See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 241 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting
in part); Goodman, supra note 179, at 384-86. Cf. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep.
Comm. School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (first amendment rights).
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impose reasonable regulations regarding a child's basic education.2°6
The constitutional rights of parents and children have never ex-
tended to dictating the public school's curriculum.
The state's interest in affording maximum choice to students
and parents is not sufficiently compelling, for example, to justify
separation by race. Even when busing is necessary to achieve racial
balance, the combined interests of the state and parents do not
outweigh the rights of minority children 2 07 When, therefore, the
minority children in a segregated bilingual program are harmed to
the same extent as were those in Brown v. Board of Education,
20 8
the state's interest in preserving individual choice does not justify
isolation of non-English speaking students. Where minimal harm
occurs, maximum latitude should be afforded to students' or par-
ents' decisions.
If the state allows enrollment in the program of English speak-
ing minorities, it is, in effect, setting up a program for all minorities,
not just those needing special language instruction. Some minority
children, pressured from a variety of sources to participate in the
bilingual program, 2 9 will be involuntarily separated. 210  The
result, stigmatizing these children without any offsetting increment
in their educational achievement, requires some greater justification
than freedom of choice.
Similarly, freedom of choice cannot justify a program that
fosters continued segregation of English speaking minorities after
English language proficiency is achieved. One court has thus ruled
that a bilingual program discouraging the transfer of English speak-
ing minority children to monolingual classes constituted deliberate
segregation:
[The bilingual program director] deliberately con-
ducted [the bilingual program] as a maintenance program
and discouraged transfer out of the program. She failed
to provide a mechanism for removing students who
reached the level of proficiency in the English language
which would enable them to understand regular English
instruction. Fifty-three students were retained in [the pro-
gram] after it had served its mandated objective. To that
206 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213 (1972).
207 See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971);
Morgan v. Kerrigan, 401 F. Supp. 216 (D. Mass. 1975), aff'd, 530 F.2d 401 (1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 935 (1976).
208 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2 0 9 See notes 191-94 supra & accompanying text.
2 10 See notes 195-98 supra & accompanying text.
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extent administration of the bilingual program was a per-
version of the purpose and a misuse of funds.
211
An optional bilingual program that is constitutionally imper-
missible for one of these reasons can be cured. Alternatives other
than bilingual education can satisfy statutory obligations 212 if only
a few students require compensatory education. A school board
unsuccessful in attracting Anglos to its bilingual program may
prohibit participation by English speaking minorities.213 Finally,
a school board may choose to require some Anglos to enroll in the
program.
Forced separation of minorities into bilingual classrooms open
only to non-English speaking students is unconstitutional. The
same is true of optional programs, open to all, that separate minority
students capable of learning in an integrated, monolingual class-
room. None of the state interests in such a program-providing
meaningful education to linguistic minorities, protecting Anglos
from educational disadvantage, and preserving students' and par-
ents' freedom of choice-are sufficient to justify the resulting harm
to these minority schoolchildren.
VI. BILINGUAL PROGRAMS AS PART OF DESEGREGATION
RMmEDIES
Even if students have no constitutional right to bilingual edu-
cation, school districts ordered to desegregate have reason to imple-
ment bilingual programs.214 Bilingual education may be a means of
facilitating integration by affording Anglos working knowledge of
a second language and appreciation of a different culture. 215 The
combination of desegregation and bilingual education demands have
produced three contrary results in the federal courts.
211 Cintron v. Brentwood Union Free School Dist., 455 F. Supp. 57, 63
(E.D.N.Y. 1978) (footnotes omitted). Although the program was thus found to
violate the Equal Educational Opportunities Act of 1974, § 204, 20 U.S.C. § 1703(a)
(1978), the decision is relevant to this discussion because the statutes standards
of impermissible deliberate segregation are identical to those of the Constitution.
See notes 69-71 supra & accompanying text.
212 See note 102 supra & accompanying text.
213 This solution, though denying English speaking minorities the benefits of
bilingual education, including exposure to their culture and language, may be the
least restrictive way of protecting the rights of those who do not wish to enroll.
For a discussion of the cultural disadvantages of this solution, see Cultural Plural-
ism, supra note 9.
214 For an extensive discussion of this area, see Comment, The Legal Status
of Bilingual Education in Americas Public Schools: Testing Ground for a Statutory
and Constitutional Interpretation of Equal Protection, 17 DuQ. L. Rmv. 473 (1979).
215 See note 23 supra & accompanying text.
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In Keyes v. School District No. 1,216 the Tenth Circuit found
bilingual education programs inconsistent with a desegregation
remedy. The district court had permitted the clustering of students
in order to conduct bilingual programs and had therefore decided
not to desegregate four elementary schools 217 with minority enroll-
ments ranging from seventy-seven to eighty-eight percent.2 18 Ruling
that bilingual education could not substitute for desegregation 219
and noting that the fourteenth amendment conveyed no independent
right to bilingual education, 220 the court of appeals reversed without
considering the benefits of bilingual education.221 The difficulty
with the Keyes approach is this implict rejection of the propositions
that segregation may produce linguistic difficulties best remedied by
bilingual education and that bilingual programs may be an educa-
tionally sound method of integrating diverse minority groups.
A district court in Morgan v. Kerrigan 222 ordered a plan sim-
ilar to the one rejected in Keyes. To accommodate demands for
both desegregation and bilingual education, the court first clustered
Spanish and Chinese speaking students in the Boston schools in suf-
ficient numbers to insure successful bilingual programs. Blacks and
Anglos were then assigned around these clusters with care not to
identify any school as a minority school. Despite this distribution
policy, the court specifically exempted one school from its thirty
percent limitation on "other minority" students. At that school,
an Hispanic enrollment of up to sixty-five precent was permitted
in order to implement a bilingual program.
223
The most far-reaching plan was adopted in United States v.
Texas,22 in which a district court found de jure segregation of
216 521 F.2d 465 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1066 (1976).
217 Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 380 F. Supp. 673, 692 (D. Colo. 1974), aff'd
in part and remanded, 521 F.2d 465 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1066
(1976).
218 Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 521 F.2d 465, 479 n.13 (10th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1066 (1976). Minority students constituted approximately
42% of the district's total student population. Id.
219 Id. 480.
220 Id. 482-83.
2 21 For a more detailed discussion of the Tenth Circuit's decision, see Cultural
Pluralism, supra note 9, at 156-60.
222401 F. Supp. 216 (D. Mass. 1975), aff'd, 530 F.2d 401 (Ist Cir.), cert.
denied, 426 U.S. 935 (1976).
223 Id. 262. The findings of the AIR Study imply that clustering may not in-
crease the achievement of students in a bilingual program. Overview, supra note
30, at 18. Although concentrating non-English speaking students in schools and
classrooms may create a financial savings, that alone seems insufficient to justify
the resulting segregation.
224 342 F. Supp. 24 (E.D. Tex. 1971), aff'd, 466 F.2d 518 (5th Cir. 1972).
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Mexican-American students. In formulating a remedy the court
reasoned:
[S]pecial education consideration... [shall] be given to the
Mexican-American students in assisting them in adjusting
to those parts of their new school environment which pre-
sent a cultural and linguistic shock. Equally clear, how-
ever, is the need to avoid the creation of a stigma of in-
feriority. . . . To avoid this result the Anglo-American
students too must be called upon to adjust to their Mexi-
can-American classmates, and to learn to understand and
appreciate their different linguistic and cultural attributes.
The process by which all students participate in a joint
learning and adjustment process will not only constitute
an educational enrichment but, also, will bring the school
system as a whole closer to that goal or state-of-being re-
ferred to by the Supreme Court as a "unitary system." 225
The court therefore ordered bilingual-bicultural programs for all
students. Other courts, though not going so far as to require bi-
lingual education for all students, have recognized that bilingual
programs facilitate integration and have upheld them as an element
of a desegration remedy.
22 6
In Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken I1),227 the Supreme Court ad-
dressed the problem of student language difficulties: "In short,
speech habits acquired in a segregated system do not vanish simply
by moving the child to a desegregated school. The root condition
shown by this record must be treated directly by special training at
the hands of teachers prepared for that task." 228 This acceptance
of special programs as part of desegregation remedies is somewhat
surprising in light of the Court's insistence that the scope of the
remedy be tailored to the scope of the violation.229 Showing that,
but for the segregation, the same degree of linguistic difficulties
225 Id. 28.
226 Evans v. Buchanan, 447 F. Supp. 982, 1016 (D. Del.), aft'd, 582 F.2d 750
(3d Cir. 1978) (ordering "curriculum offerings and programs which emphasize and
reflect the cultural pluralism of the students"). See United States v. Texas Educ.
Agency, 532 F.2d 380, 398 (5th Cir, 1977), cert. denied, 47 U.S.L.W. 3838 (U.S.
July 2, 1979) (No. 78-897); Bradley v. Milliken, 402 F. Supp. 1096, 1144 (E.D.
Mich. 1975), aff'd, 433 U.S. 267 (1977); Quality Educ. for All Children, Inc. v.
School Bd., 385 F. Supp. 803 (N.D. M. 1974).
227 433 U.S. 267 (1977).
228 Id. 288.
229 See id.; Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406 (1977)..
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would not have existed will likely prove difficult. Certainly mi-
norities with a native language other than English experience similar
linguistic difficulties in segregated as in desegregated districts.
2 30
In any event, Milliken II lends support to the position adopted in
Texas and Morgan that a bilingual program may properly be in-
cluded as part of a desegregation plan.
Although Texas and Morgan both provided for bilingual pro-
grams, the former court required integration while the latter
countenanced some continued separation. In the context of a
desegregation order, the Texas approach has distinct advantages.
This plan treats the effects of segregation on all groups by requiring
that each gain exposure to the language and culture of the other.
It performs a socialization function by combating the mistrust and
stereotyping attendant segregation and provides an opportunity
for ongoing personal interaction among students of differing na-
tional origins. Moreover, integrated classrooms avoid the possi-
bility of any stigma whatsoever attaching to a bilingual program.231
The Texas plan does, however, have drawbacks. Some stu-
dents required to participate might otherwise have chosen a dif-
ferent option. Furthermore, such an approach might be appropriate
only in areas with sufficient numbers of minority students. Some
clustering may be necessary for optimum educational results in dis-
tricts with few minority children or with groups speaking a variety
of languages. The Texas plan is thus most feasible in districts
with close to equal numbers of minority and Anglo students. In
other districts, some variation of the Morgan plan may be optimal
as long as the maximum possible integration is guaranteed in the
"clustered" schools. In all districts, though, bilingual education
and integration can work together to provide for all students a
quality education consistent with constitutional requirements.
2 o The Court did stress that "the need for [the specific educational remedies
ordered] flowed directly from constitutional violations" and that these measures
were "necessary to restore the victims of discriminatory conduct to the position they
would have enjoyed in terms of education." Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 282
(1977). The Third Circuit has suggested that Milliken authorizes ancillary relief
designed to alleviate the pressures of segregation. Evans v. Buchanan, 582 F.2d
750, 768-69 (3d Cir. 1978). See Bradley v. Milliken, 402 F. Supp. 1096, 1144
(E.D. Mich. 1975), aff'd, 433 U.S. 267 (1977) ("Multi-ethnic studies are essen-
tial elements of the curriculum of any outstanding school system; desegregation serves
only to emphasize the need for inclusion of these studies."). The Supreme Court's
opinion in Milliken is not always, however, read so broadly. E.g., Cultural Plural-
ism, supra note 9, at 159 ("it was not an abuse of discretion for a district court
to order a comprehensive reading program as part of a desegregation remedy when
that program was narrowly tailofed to return the school children to the position
they would have been in absent violations").
281 See notes 179-83 supra & accompanying text.
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VII. CONCLUSION
This Comment has examined the theoretical and legal con-
straints on the national origin composition of bilingual classrooms.
The goals of integration and bilingual education can be seen as
compatible or conflicting-given both theoretical and empirical con-
siderations-depending on one's value choices. The position of this
Comment is that the two are compatible-that integrated bilingual
classrooms can give all students exposure to and appreciation of
their own and other cultures and at the same time provide them a
sound education.
Although neither the Constitution nor the federal statutes
clearly create an obligation to implement bilingual education, such
programs have been ordered by HEW and have properly been in-
cluded as one part of desegregation remedies. The Constitution may
not require bilingual education, but any bilingual program imple-
mented, in order to withstand constitutional scrutiny, should be
both optional and open to all students. Mandatory, segregated bi-
lingual education is unconstitutional. Any compulsion on the part
of a school district forcing the participation of English speaking
minority students into segregated programs also renders the program
constitutionally impermissible.
